Release date: March 25, 2026

DOI: https://doi.org/10.25318/36280001202600300003-eng

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Abstract

A central concern surrounding recent advances in generative artificial intelligence (AI) technologies is their potential to replace human labour, especially in the domain of content creation, such as the production of music, videos, images and text in the cultural industries. However, there is a lack of information regarding how AI may impact workers in these industries. This article attempts to fill this information gap by examining potential occupational exposure to and complementarity with AI in selected cultural industries in Canada. A key finding is that occupations in cultural industries could potentially be more exposed to AI-related job transformation, facing a higher potential for AI substitution compared with jobs in other industries. However, jobs in cultural industries also have a greater potential to be augmented by AI. Although some evidence suggests relatively slower employment growth in certain cultural industries since the mass availability of generative AI tools in late 2022, it remains unclear whether the observed changes are solely driven by AI or result from the cumulative effects of pre-existing trends and other competing economic forces.

Acknowledgments

This article was supported by Canadian Heritage. The authors would like to thank Ryan Macdonald, Marc Frenette, Ping Ching Winnie Chan, Meghan Fulford and Behnoush Amery for their helpful comments and suggestions.

Authors

Tahsin Mehdi, Josip Lesica and Jenny Watt are with the Economic and Social Analysis and Modelling Division, Analytical Studies and Modelling Branch, at Statistics Canada. Rupert Allen is with the Strategic Policy, Planning and Research Directorate at Canadian Heritage.

Introduction

The mass availability of generative artificial intelligence (AI) tools has lowered the barriers for producing new creative content such as music, videos, images and text in the cultural industries.Note  This means that the tools for idea creation are potentially more accessible, creative work could be reproduced at a lower marginal cost and global distribution in many cases could be virtually costless (Allen et al. 2025). This could lead to new opportunities and challenges for cultural industries.Note  As a result, cultural products may be produced at a lower cost, and potential markets for them could expand. Recent and rapid technological advances raise the possibility of AI replacing human labour in content creation; conversely, AI could also complement and augment human creative processes, potentially transforming future roles of workers in cultural industries.

However, there is a lack of information about the potential impact of AI on employment across these cultural industries. This article attempts to fill this information gap by leveraging data from the 2021 Census of Population; the Canadian Employer–Employee Dynamics Database; and the Survey of Employment, Payrolls and Hours (SEPH). The focus is on employees in the commercial sector and employed in the following industries in the 2022 version of the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS): video game publishers (513212) and video game design and development services (541515),Note  publishing industries (except video game publishers) (513, excluding 513212), sound recording industries (5122) and musical groups and artists (71113), and motion picture and video industries (5121). These industries collectively made up 1% of the Canadian workforce in 2022, although not all workers within them produce purely “cultural” outputs. Except for video game design and development services (541515) and musical groups and artists (71113), these industries represented about 40% of the broader group of information and cultural industries (51) in the 12 months preceding the second quarter of 2025. Over this period, about 12% of all Canadian businesses reported using AI, with businesses in information and cultural industries (36%) being substantially more likely to report using AI. In both cases, however, around 6% of AI adopters reported reducing employment because of AI usage (Bryan et al. 2025).

To analyze the relationship between AI and employment in these industries, this article uses the complementarity-adjusted AI occupational exposure (C-AIOE) index, which categorizes occupations within industries into three groups: (1) high exposure and low complementarity, (2) high exposure and high complementarity, and (3) low exposure. The index assigns an exposure and complementarity score to each occupation and then classifies it as having high or low exposure and high or low complementarity based on the median exposure and complementarity score across all occupations. Occupational exposure to AI can be thought of as the potential for AI applications to substitute, complement or transform tasks within an occupation. Complementarity can be thought of as the degree to which AI technologies may augment or enhance human labour. The C-AIOE index was developed in the United States by Felten et al. (2021) and Pizzinelli et al. (2023). Mehdi and Morissette (2024) and Mehdi and Frenette (2024, 2026) applied the method to examine the potential impact of AI on the broader Canadian workforce.

Jobs in selected cultural industries are potentially more exposed to generative artificial intelligence technologies

Chart 1 indicates that the selected group of cultural industries—video game publishers and video game design and development services, publishing industries (except video game publishers), sound recording industries and musical groups and artists, and motion picture and video industries—could potentially be more exposed to AI technologies than other sectors of the economy.

Chart 1: Employment distribution across industries by potential artificial intelligence occupational exposure and complementarity, 2021

Data table for Chart 1
Data table for chart 1
Table summary
This table displays the results of Data table for chart 1 High exposure and low complementarity, High exposure and high complementarity and Low exposure, calculated using percent units of measure (appearing as column headers).
  High exposure and low complementarity High exposure and high complementarity Low exposure
percent
Note x

suppressed to meet the confidentiality requirements of the Statistics Act

Notes: The sample consists of employees aged 18 to 64 living off reserve in private dwellings, excluding full-time members of the Canadian Armed Forces. Public administration, educational services, and health care and social assistance industries were excluded. Starting in 2021, the men+ category includes men (and boys), as well as some non-binary people, and the women+ category includes women (and girls), as well as some non-binary people. Occupational data from the 2021 Census of Population were integrated with the 2021 Canadian Employer–Employee Dynamics Database (CEEDD) to obtain detailed information on industries. Since the 2021 CEEDD is based on tax data, it may not necessarily reflect the same industry of employment as the one observed for the census reference week in May 2021. For this reason, the sample was further restricted to employees who were with the same employer in 2020 and 2021. Industries were grouped according to the 2022 version of the North American Industry Classification System: video game publishers (513212) and video game design and development services (541515), publishing industries (except video game publishers) (513, excluding 513212), sound recording industries (5122) and musical groups and artists (71113), motion picture and video industries (5121), public administration (91), educational services (61), and health care and social assistance (62). Potential artificial intelligence occupational exposure and complementarity were computed using the measure developed by Felten et al. (2021) and Pizzinelli et al. (2023).
Sources: Statistics Canada, Census of Population, 2021, and Canadian Employer–Employee Dynamics Database, 2020 and 2021; and Occupational Information Network.
Men+  
Video game publishers and video game design and development services 78.8 18.0 3.2
Publishing industries (except video game publishers) 59.1 31.9 9.0
Sound recording industries and musical groups and artists 58.8 x suppressed to meet the confidentiality requirements of the Statistics Act x suppressed to meet the confidentiality requirements of the Statistics Act
Motion picture and video industries 55.2 29.2 15.6
Other industries 22.4 23.9 53.7
Women+  
Video game publishers and video game design and development services 71.6 25.2 3.2
Publishing industries (except video game publishers) 59.4 35.3 5.3
Sound recording industries and musical groups and artists 59.6 x suppressed to meet the confidentiality requirements of the Statistics Act x suppressed to meet the confidentiality requirements of the Statistics Act
Motion picture and video industries 52.7 34.0 13.3
Other industries 44.6 24.5 30.9

Occupations in the selected cultural industries skew heavily towards computer systems professionals, graphic artists and musicians, who may face relatively more AI-related job transformation because their jobs are more dependent on interfacing with digital technologies. Over 50% of jobs in the selected cultural industries are potentially highly exposed to and less complementary with AI technologies, versus less than 45% of jobs in other sectors of the economy.Note  Some of these industries could face a higher likelihood of AI-related job transformation than others. For example, more than 70% of the jobs held by men and women in video game publishing and video game design and development services could potentially be highly exposed to and less complementary with AI.

Conversely, and with the exception of video game publishers and video game design and development services, roughly 30% to 35% of jobs in the selected cultural industries are potentially highly complementary with AI technologies. These jobs have relatively more potential to be augmented or enhanced by AI. By contrast, about 25% of jobs may fall into this category in other industries.

While there is considerable uncertainty surrounding the scale of disruption that could be triggered by AI, it is also important to consider the quality of jobs that could potentially face disruption in cultural industries. For example, in 2022, median annual wages (in constant 2025 dollars) for video game publishers and video game design and development services ($96,000), publishing industries (except video game publishers) ($85,000), motion picture and video industries ($59,000), and sound recording industries and musical groups and artists ($57,000) were substantially higher than median annual wages in other industries ($50,000). With the exception of motion picture and video industries, jobs in the selected cultural industries were also more likely to be full-time and permanent compared with jobs in other industries.

Employment growth varied substantially across selected cultural industries since the mass availability of generative artificial intelligence technologies

Chart 2 shows monthly employment growth across selected cultural industries from January 2018 to November 2025 relative to the level observed in November 2022 - when ChatGPT became widely available and led to the mass availability of other generative AI tools.Note  Employment decreased substantially from November 2022 to November 2025 in motion picture and video industries (-26%); newspaper, periodical, book and directory publishers (-15%); and software publishers (-9%). Some of these decreases were a continuation of pre-existing trends. For example, employment in newspaper, periodical, book and directory publishers has been declining since well before November 2022. Employment in other cultural industries grew at a similar rate (1%) as the rest of the economy.

Chart 2: Monthly employment growth across selected industries (November 2022 = 100), seasonally adjusted, January 2018 to November 2025

Data table for Chart 2
Data table for chart 2
Table summary
This table displays the results of Data table for chart 2 Newspaper, periodical, book and directory publishers, Software publishers, Motion picture and video industries, Computer systems design and related services, Performing arts companies and Other industries (except sound recording industries), calculated using index (November 2022 = 100) units of measure (appearing as column headers).
  Newspaper, periodical, book and directory publishers Software publishers Motion picture and video industries Computer systems design and related services Performing arts companies Other industries (except sound recording industries)
index (November 2022 = 100)
Notes: The dashed vertical line marks the beginning of the mass availability of ChatGPT and other generative artificial intelligence (AI) tools in November 2022. Public administration, educational services, and health care and social assistance industries were excluded. Employment growth is expressed relative to the level observed in November 2022. For example, an index of 70 would indicate a 30% decrease (70 - 100 = -30) in employment relative to the November 2022 level, while an index of 130 would indicate a 30% increase (130 - 100 = 30). Employment growth trend for sound recording industries, which accounted for 0.02% of employment in November 2025, was excluded for ease of presentation. Employment growth trends since November 2022 do not necessarily reflect advances in generative AI alone. Other economic factors also played a role in shaping employment growth trends.
Source: Statistics Canada, table 14-10-0220-01 Employment and average weekly earnings (including overtime) for all employees by industry, monthly, seasonally adjusted, Canada.
2018  
January 136.2 71.6 71.8 61.8 114.3 93.7
February 137.2 73.0 73.6 62.4 117.2 94.0
March 137.2 73.1 71.5 63.4 116.4 94.4
April 136.1 74.0 71.4 63.4 118.4 94.3
May 133.9 73.9 73.5 64.0 121.2 94.7
June 132.6 74.6 73.4 64.2 121.4 94.8
July 131.5 75.0 72.1 64.3 121.2 94.7
August 127.3 75.5 72.1 64.8 122.2 94.9
September 128.0 76.5 70.6 64.8 121.1 95.1
October 129.1 77.0 71.3 65.4 126.2 95.3
November 126.3 76.7 71.0 65.7 126.8 96.0
December 126.2 78.0 70.2 65.9 125.8 96.0
2019  
January 126.1 79.5 72.8 66.3 127.3 96.3
February 127.8 79.6 73.2 66.4 128.9 96.5
March 128.7 80.3 74.5 66.9 130.7 96.6
April 128.0 79.8 74.8 67.3 128.4 96.5
May 126.6 81.2 76.0 67.4 130.8 96.6
June 125.1 79.5 77.1 68.1 128.4 96.7
July 124.6 79.6 76.5 68.7 130.9 96.9
August 122.9 79.7 76.7 69.3 130.3 97.0
September 121.8 79.7 77.8 69.4 134.3 96.9
October 121.1 81.4 77.6 69.5 138.6 96.9
November 119.4 80.4 78.9 70.1 140.8 97.0
December 117.4 81.0 80.2 70.2 139.9 97.1
2020  
January 116.8 81.5 82.8 70.2 135.8 97.1
February 114.4 81.6 83.1 70.6 137.6 97.0
March 107.9 81.9 75.8 69.2 124.8 90.2
April 102.4 81.8 57.1 69.1 84.5 77.9
May 102.8 80.9 38.4 68.8 70.0 75.5
June 103.4 80.7 38.3 68.8 67.4 80.1
July 105.3 81.1 41.5 70.1 72.9 84.3
August 104.9 82.7 54.1 70.8 69.3 86.4
September 101.4 84.0 69.8 71.3 82.8 88.3
October 103.7 84.8 74.9 72.0 74.9 89.5
November 101.8 85.3 72.6 72.7 75.5 89.2
December 102.8 86.0 71.4 73.2 66.7 89.3
2021  
January 103.6 87.0 70.8 74.3 74.7 88.3
February 103.8 88.0 73.5 75.0 72.8 88.8
March 102.7 88.8 74.5 75.6 70.8 90.3
April 100.9 89.5 74.0 76.3 66.2 91.0
May 102.8 90.2 73.5 77.7 60.9 89.3
June 102.4 90.7 73.5 78.7 64.1 90.6
July 101.3 92.5 76.6 79.3 76.8 92.6
August 101.7 93.6 78.0 79.9 81.8 93.5
September 102.2 94.9 80.3 82.6 84.1 94.0
October 102.5 97.1 82.8 83.7 83.1 94.8
November 103.1 98.3 83.0 85.0 84.1 95.2
December 103.6 99.0 84.9 86.5 90.8 95.8
2022  
January 102.0 97.7 80.5 88.5 94.1 95.7
February 104.2 99.7 83.0 89.5 93.3 96.3
March 103.3 99.7 83.1 90.9 97.7 97.3
April 102.8 99.6 91.7 92.5 102.3 98.0
May 101.1 99.3 92.0 93.5 104.9 98.0
June 100.0 101.0 93.4 94.5 108.0 98.7
July 100.4 102.5 94.3 96.4 108.9 99.0
August 101.9 102.4 97.3 97.3 111.4 99.1
September 101.1 101.4 100.1 98.3 110.8 99.6
October 101.0 101.9 100.8 99.6 101.6 99.7
November 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
December 97.8 99.2 98.8 100.4 99.2 100.3
2023  
January 98.2 99.0 93.2 100.6 101.5 100.6
February 98.2 98.4 90.3 100.8 103.5 100.9
March 98.2 99.0 87.1 101.0 104.7 100.8
April 97.2 97.4 86.9 101.4 104.5 100.9
May 95.4 96.8 87.3 101.6 104.8 101.1
June 94.6 94.1 83.6 101.9 102.0 101.2
July 94.3 94.1 78.9 101.1 105.4 101.1
August 94.0 93.6 76.9 101.3 106.7 101.1
September 94.7 94.3 73.4 100.9 106.9 101.2
October 93.4 94.5 71.2 100.9 111.2 101.0
November 92.1 94.1 73.2 100.5 111.5 100.9
December 92.1 93.6 74.8 99.9 109.1 100.8
2024  
January 91.4 94.5 82.4 100.4 103.4 101.1
February 90.9 95.9 80.7 100.3 102.8 101.0
March 91.2 95.5 81.4 100.1 101.8 101.1
April 87.9 95.3 82.1 99.9 100.9 101.0
May 87.4 95.2 82.7 99.7 100.9 101.2
June 86.5 95.4 83.2 99.3 104.9 101.0
July 84.9 93.4 83.9 99.2 107.1 101.0
August 85.3 94.1 82.7 98.7 106.9 101.1
September 82.9 94.0 82.8 98.5 107.5 100.9
October 83.8 91.8 82.8 97.8 103.5 100.9
November 83.3 92.2 80.6 98.1 106.0 100.7
December 81.8 91.6 76.8 98.0 104.1 101.1
2025  
January 83.0 93.1 76.1 97.9 108.3 101.0
February 83.3 94.1 74.5 97.9 107.3 100.9
March 82.6 93.9 73.0 98.0 106.0 100.7
April 82.8 92.8 73.4 98.0 103.7 100.6
May 83.1 94.4 76.1 98.3 105.1 100.8
June 85.9 94.9 75.7 98.2 106.6 100.6
July 84.3 93.4 76.1 98.8 104.7 100.8
August 84.7 91.3 78.6 98.5 105.4 100.8
September 83.9 91.7 78.7 98.5 105.7 100.7
October 84.6 92.5 79.7 98.5 103.7 100.8
November 84.8 91.4 73.7 98.5 101.1 100.6

However, the mass availability of generative AI tools coincided with other concurrent economic events, such as rapid demographic shifts driven by increased immigration levels in Canada, labour market adjustments following the COVID-19 pandemic (e.g., a substantial drop in job vacancies across industries since mid-2022; Convery et al. 2024) and recent trade tensions with the United States beginning in early 2025 (Statistics Canada 2025). These events may have led to structural changes across Canadian industries. Consequently, the employment trends after November 2022 shown in Chart 2 reflect a confluence of economic factors beyond the mass availability of generative AI tools.

Conclusion

While there is considerable uncertainty regarding the extent to which AI could disrupt the labour market, especially in the domain of content creation, this article finds that the majority of jobs in the selected cultural industries—video game publishers and video game design and development services,  publishing industries (except video game publishers), sound recording industries and musical groups and artists, and motion picture and video industries—have potentially high exposure to and low complementarity with AI. This suggests greater potential for AI to replace tasks within these occupations. However, some jobs in these industries are also more likely to be classified as high exposure and high complementarity, meaning that there is substantial potential for AI to augment jobs in cultural occupations rather than replace human labour. Although there is some evidence of declining employment in certain cultural industries since the mass availability of generative AI tools in late 2022, it is not clear whether the observed changes are solely driven by AI or instead reflect the cumulative effects of pre-existing trends combined with other competing economic forces.

The estimates presented in this article are largely based on the technological feasibility of replacing job tasks. Employers may not immediately replace human labour with AI even if it is technologically feasible to do so, because of financial, legal and institutional factors. Therefore, exposure to AI does not necessarily imply a risk of job loss. At the very least, it could imply a certain degree of job transformation as generative AI tools hold the potential to reshape some tasks and workflows within occupations. Given the uncertainties surrounding technological progress and implementation, the estimates presented in this article should be interpreted with caution when drawing any conclusions regarding the likelihood of AI replacing jobs in cultural industries.

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