Research to Insights: Investment, Productivity and Living Standards

Release date: September 1, 2022

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About Research to Insights

The Research to Insights series of presentations features a broad range of findings on selected topics of research. Each presentation will draw from and integrate evidence from many different studies that use innovative and high-quality data and methods to better understand relevant and complex policy issues.

Based on applied research of valuable data, the series is intended to provide decision makers, and Canadians more broadly, a comprehensive and horizontal view of the current social, economic and health issues we face in a changing world.

Context: What is productivity?

  • Productivity is a measure of how efficiently businesses make use of their labour and capital in the production of products and services. This presentation focuses on labour productivity, a measure of efficiency widely used in conjunction with data on labour costs and profitability to gauge the competitiveness of Canadian businesses.
  • Labour productivity rises if more real (or inflation adjusted) output can be produced per hour worked. It depends on (1) the amount and type of capital assets that are available to workers; (2) the skills that workers possess; and (3) a range of other efficiency-related factors, outside of those measured directly in capital and labour, that can affect the amount of output produced (these include technological progress, organizational changes and scale economies).
  • The reallocation of productive resources across industries and firms also affects labour productivity for the economy as a whole. This process of reallocation can encompass structural effects when labour inputs are shifted across industries and when more productive firms displace less productive competitors.

Why is productivity important?

“Productivity growth is vital to non-inflationary growth and rising standards of living. At a time when inflation is already well above target, this is more vital than ever.”

Tiff Macklem, Governor of the Bank of Canada, February 9, 2022, at the Canadian Chamber of Commerce.

Higher productivity leads to improvements in material well-being

  • Over the last four decades, increases in labour productivity have been responsible for about 90% of the increase in Canada’s gross domestic product per capita.
  • Historically, changes in labour productivity have closely tracked real wage growth.

Improving productivity will become increasingly important as the workforce continues to age

  • Higher productivity will be required to sustain long-term improvements in living standards because of the structural impacts that population aging will have on Canada’s labour force. Nearly one in five workers will be approaching retirement age in the coming decade; further increases in the employment-to-population ratio are not expected (2021 Census).

Chart 1

Data table for chart 1 
Trends in gross domestic product per capita and its components, 1981 to 2021
Table summary
This table displays the results of Trends in gross domestic product per capita and its components GDP per capita, GDP per hour, Hours per employment and Employment per population, calculated using percent units of measure (appearing as column headers).
GDP per capita GDP per hour Hours per employment Employment per population
index (1981 = 100)
1981 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1982 95.7 101.4 98.6 95.7
1983 97.2 103.7 98.3 95.4
1984 102.0 106.5 98.8 96.9
1985 105.8 107.5 99.4 99.0
1986 107.0 106.6 99.4 101.0
1987 109.9 107.1 100.2 102.4
1988 113.3 108.2 100.5 104.1
1989 113.9 108.4 100.4 104.6
1990 112.3 108.4 99.9 103.8
1991 108.6 109.3 98.7 100.7
1992 108.3 111.4 98.7 98.5
1993 110.0 113.5 99.0 97.9
1994 113.7 115.4 99.6 98.9
1995 115.5 116.7 99.4 99.6
1996 116.2 116.5 100.2 99.5
1997 120.0 119.8 99.5 100.6
1998 123.6 122.0 99.1 102.3
1999 128.9 125.0 99.2 104.0
2000 134.4 129.0 98.6 105.6
2001 135.3 131.0 97.7 105.7
2002 137.9 133.2 96.7 107.1
2003 139.1 133.4 95.9 108.7
2004 142.1 134.5 96.5 109.4
2005 145.2 137.5 96.2 109.8
2006 147.6 139.1 96.1 110.4
2007 149.2 139.3 96.0 111.6
2008 149.0 138.8 95.9 112.0
2009 143.0 139.4 94.2 108.9
2010 145.8 140.9 94.8 109.2
2011 148.9 143.2 94.7 109.8
2012 149.9 143.7 95.0 109.8
2013 151.8 145.8 94.6 110.0
2014 154.6 149.8 94.3 109.5
2015 154.5 149.5 94.4 109.4
2016 154.3 150.1 94.4 108.9
2017 157.0 152.5 93.8 109.8
2018 159.1 153.0 94.6 110.0
2019 159.8 154.3 93.4 110.9
2020 149.7 165.6 87.0 103.9
2021 155.7 156.3 92.0 108.3

What are the drivers of labour productivity?

  • Capital intensity is driven by business investment in two types of capital:
    • Tangible capital (e.g., buildings and structures, machinery and equipment, and information and communications technology)
    • Intangible capital (e.g., software, research and development, and mineral exploration and evaluation).
  • Labour quality reflects the skills composition of the workforce (and depends in part on changes in educational attainment over time).
  • Multifactor productivity captures all other factors—including technological change, organizational change, capacity utilization and economies of scale—that can affect output growth. 

Sources of labour productivity growth in the business sector
Table summary
This table displays the results of Sources of labour productivity growth in the business sector 1980 to 2000, 2000 to 2010 and 2010 to 2019 (appearing as column headers).
1980 to 2000 2000 to 2010 2010 to 2019
Labour productivity growth (%) 1.7 0.7 1.2
Percentage point contribution from:
Capital intensity 0.9 1.0 0.4
Labour quality 0.4 0.3 0.2
Multifactor productivity 0.5 -0.6 0.6

Competition matters: Underneath this aggregate view of productivity are industries, firms and workers. As productive resources shift between industries and firms—and as less productive firms exit and more productive firms enter—aggregate productivity will also change.

Background: Productivity trends prior to COVID-19 

  • Canada’s productivity gap with the United States widened during the 1990s and 2000s. Slower productivity growth in Canada reflected, in part, lower spending on information and communications technology. This fueled productivity gains south of the border, especially in high-tech services. 
  • Canada’s productivity performance improved following the 2008/2009 recession as demand strengthened, especially for Canadian resources. Business investment, bolstered by large capital outlays in oil and gas extraction, and business investment in information and communications technology supported productivity growth during this period.
  • Labour productivity growth slowed between 2015 and 2019 as the economy adjusted to lower oil prices. Just before the COVID-19 pandemic, non-residential business investment was about 20% below peak levels reported in late 2014.

Chart 2

Data table for chart 2 
Business sector labour productivity, Canada and the United States
Table summary
This table displays the results of Business sector labour productivity Canada and United States, calculated using percent units of measure (appearing as column headers).
Canada United States
index (Q1 1981 = 100)
1981
Q1 100.0 100.0
Q2 100.3 99.1
Q3 99.4 100.5
Q4 100.0 99.3
1982
Q1 100.3 98.9
Q2 101.3 99.0
Q3 102.6 99.0
Q4 102.2 99.9
1983
Q1 104.6 100.8
Q2 104.9 102.5
Q3 104.4 103.0
Q4 106.3 103.9
1984
Q1 108.1 104.4
Q2 109.3 105.4
Q3 108.3 105.9
Q4 109.6 106.2
1985
Q1 110.8 106.6
Q2 109.9 107.1
Q3 109.8 108.8
Q4 110.2 109.2
1986
Q1 108.9 110.2
Q2 109.6 110.9
Q3 109.8 111.5
Q4 107.4 111.2
1987
Q1 109.1 110.8
Q2 109.0 111.5
Q3 110.4 111.6
Q4 110.4 112.6
1988
Q1 111.5 112.9
Q2 111.3 113.1
Q3 110.9 113.4
Q4 110.9 113.7
1989
Q1 111.6 113.9
Q2 111.4 114.5
Q3 110.9 114.9
Q4 110.9 115.0
1990
Q1 111.6 116.2
Q2 110.9 117.2
Q3 110.2 117.7
Q4 110.2 116.5
1991
Q1 110.3 116.8
Q2 110.8 118.7
Q3 111.1 119.5
Q4 111.2 120.2
1992
Q1 112.1 122.9
Q2 112.7 123.8
Q3 113.9 124.9
Q4 114.5 125.7
1993
Q1 114.2 124.7
Q2 115.2 124.1
Q3 116.5 124.0
Q4 116.1 124.9
1994
Q1 117.9 125.2
Q2 118.5 125.1
Q3 118.3 124.5
Q4 117.8 125.7
1995
Q1 119.8 125.5
Q2 119.7 125.9
Q3 118.9 126.0
Q4 119.0 126.8
1996
Q1 118.0 127.8
Q2 118.2 129.2
Q3 118.3 129.7
Q4 119.4 129.9
1997
Q1 121.2 129.6
Q2 122.1 131.6
Q3 122.0 132.9
Q4 122.4 133.6
1998
Q1 125.3 134.8
Q2 124.3 135.4
Q3 124.7 137.3
Q4 125.5 138.4
1999
Q1 128.2 140.6
Q2 127.6 141.1
Q3 130.0 142.4
Q4 130.0 144.3
2000
Q1 132.7 143.9
Q2 134.2 146.8
Q3 135.4 146.8
Q4 134.4 148.4
2001
Q1 134.6 147.6
Q2 136.0 150.0
Q3 137.0 150.9
Q4 138.6 152.9
2002
Q1 139.2 155.6
Q2 138.5 156.3
Q3 138.9 157.6
Q4 138.8 157.4
2003
Q1 138.5 159.0
Q2 139.5 161.6
Q3 139.1 164.5
Q4 138.3 165.8
2004
Q1 138.0 166.1
Q2 139.0 167.4
Q3 140.7 168.2
Q4 141.4 169.7
2005
Q1 141.4 171.3
Q2 142.1 170.7
Q3 144.0 171.9
Q4 145.0 172.3
2006
Q1 145.7 173.7
Q2 144.4 173.3
Q3 144.9 172.6
Q4 145.5 173.8
2007
Q1 146.1 174.4
Q2 146.0 175.0
Q3 145.4 176.7
Q4 144.1 177.8
2008
Q1 143.5 176.8
Q2 143.7 178.7
Q3 145.5 179.0
Q4 144.9 178.0
2009
Q1 143.7 179.9
Q2 144.1 183.5
Q3 144.5 186.2
Q4 146.1 189.1
2010
Q1 145.7 190.0
Q2 144.7 190.1
Q3 146.3 191.3
Q4 146.4 192.1
2011
Q1 147.4 190.7
Q2 147.5 190.8
Q3 148.4 190.2
Q4 149.8 191.5
2012
Q1 149.3 192.2
Q2 148.2 193.0
Q3 147.9 192.8
Q4 147.9 192.3
2013
Q1 148.9 193.8
Q2 149.8 193.5
Q3 151.1 194.2
Q4 153.0 195.4
2014
Q1 152.5 193.6
Q2 155.4 195.3
Q3 157.0 196.6
Q4 157.5 195.4
2015
Q1 156.4 197.0
Q2 154.3 197.7
Q3 154.1 197.6
Q4 154.1 196.8
2016
Q1 154.2 197.5
Q2 153.8 197.2
Q3 156.1 198.0
Q4 156.1 199.6
2017
Q1 158.0 199.5
Q2 158.2 199.1
Q3 157.2 200.9
Q4 157.6 201.7
2018
Q1 157.5 202.5
Q2 158.8 203.5
Q3 159.3 203.9
Q4 159.0 204.0
2019
Q1 159.2 205.6
Q2 159.3 207.5
Q3 160.1 208.0
Q4 160.7 208.7
2020
Q1 166.6 207.8
Q2 187.7 212.4
Q3 169.7 216.2
Q4 166.9 214.3
2021
Q1 162.8 215.5
Q2 161.6 217.3
Q3 159.6 215.2
Q4 158.8 218.5

COVID-19: Early productivity gains dissipate as employment and hours worked recover

  • Large increases in aggregate productivity early in the pandemic reflected large reductions in hours worked in non-essential businesses that were heavily impacted by lockdown measures.
  • The overall shift in hours worked away from non-essential activities (where productivity is generally lower) to essential activities (where productivity is higher) resulted in higher productivity for the economy as a whole.
  • These structural effects dissipated in 2021 as non-essential businesses ramped up. Productivity fell as the number of hours worked rebounded more quickly than output.
  • Labour productivity has declined for seven consecutive quarters. Aggregate productivity in the first quarter of 2021 was 1.3% below pre-pandemic levels. 

Chart 3

Data table for chart 3 
Hours worked in Canadian businesses rebound faster than real output, quarterly percentage change
Table summary
This table displays the results of Hours worked in Canadian businesses rebound faster than real output. The information is grouped by Labour productivity measures and related measures (appearing as row headers), Real gross domestic product, Hours worked and Labour productivity, calculated using percent units of measure (appearing as column headers).
Labour productivity measures and related measures Real gross domestic product Hours worked Labour productivity
percent
2019
Q4 0.3 -0.1 0.4
2020
Q1 -2.7 -6.2 3.7
Q2 -13.5 -23.2 12.6
Q3 10.9 22.7 -9.6
Q4 2.5 4.2 -1.6
2021
Q1 1.1 3.6 -2.4
Q2 -1.3 -0.9 -0.5
Q3 1.3 2.4 -1.1
Q4 2.0 2.6 -0.6
2022
Q1 0.9 1.4 -0.5

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Growing pressures on cost competitiveness: In early 2022, unit labour costs, which measure the payments to labour required to produce a unit of output, were over 12% above pre-pandemic levels. Worker compensation has outpaced productivity gains over the course of the pandemic.

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COVID-19: Productivity impacts differ across sectors as businesses continue to adjust 

Technology-intensive sectors more resilient

  • Industries that rely more heavily on technology-based services were more resilient during the pandemic. Higher digital intensity in finance and wholesale trade contributed to productivity gains, while the rapid recovery in retail volumes reflected the rapid transition to digital-based platforms.

Productivity impacts obscured by strong labour demand

  • Labour productivity in professional, scientific and technical services in early 2022 remained 5% below pre-pandemic levels as large increases in hours worked have outpaced output gains. This sector has added over 200,000 payroll jobs (+15%) since the start of the pandemic.

Chart 4

Data table for chart 4 
Net productivity growth by industry, fourth quarter of 2019 to first quarter of 2021
Table summary
This table displays the results of Net productivity growth by industry. The information is grouped by Industry (appearing as row headers), Net Productivity Growth, calculated using percent units of measure (appearing as column headers).
Industry Net Productivity Growth
percent
Arts, entertainment and recreation -22.6
Administrative and support, waste management and remediation services -13.2
Transportation and warehousing -12.2
Information and cultural industries -5.7
Professional, scientific and technical services -5.1
Accommodation and food services -2.2
Mining and oil and gas extraction -1.8
Manufacturing -1.5
Business sector -1.3
Construction -0.9
Real estate and rental and leasing 0.7
Non-business sector and others 1.1
Other business services 1.7
Utilities 1.9
Finance and insurance, and holding companies 2.3
Wholesale trade 4.4
Retail trade 8.5
Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting 10.5

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Competitive turnover may be impacting productivity growth within many industries: Relatively more lower-productivity businesses closed during COVID-19 than during the 2008/2009 recession.  

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Sustained productivity gains in the coming years will need to be fuelled by new business investment

“As we emerge from the COVID-19 pandemic, Canada has the opportunity to make long overdue gains in productivity. In the years ahead, business investment decisions will determine the path of Canada’s productivity growth.”

Tiff Macklem, Governor of the Bank of Canada, February 9, 2022, at the Canadian Chamber of Commerce

Before COVID-19, lower business investment in productivity-enhancing assets weighed on productivity growth

  • Overall business spending on structures and machinery and equipment has trended lower since oil prices fell sharply in the mid-2010s. These outlays have also been slow to recover from COVID-19.
  • In early 2022, real outlays on non-residential structures and machinery and equipment were 4% below pre-COVID-19 levels and 22% below peak levels in 2014.
  • Real spending on research and development was 8% below pre-pandemic levels and 11% below levels reported in 2014.

Chart 5

Data table for chart 5 
Non-residential business investment by type of asset
Table summary
This table displays the results of Non-residential business investment by type of asset Non-residential structures, Machinery and equipment and Intellectual property products, calculated using percent units of measure (appearing as column headers).
Non-residential structures Machinery and equipment Intellectual property products
index (Q1 2007 = 100)
2007
Q1 100.0 100.0 100.0
Q2 99.8 101.2 100.7
Q3 100.2 101.6 102.1
Q4 100.5 105.0 104.5
2008
Q1 107.2 105.4 107.6
Q2 108.7 104.1 107.6
Q3 109.3 103.3 105.8
Q4 106.6 95.3 100.1
2009
Q1 91.8 79.1 88.0
Q2 85.7 77.9 85.4
Q3 84.9 80.3 85.6
Q4 85.7 84.3 87.7
2010
Q1 93.9 84.9 91.8
Q2 98.6 88.8 95.6
Q3 104.7 89.2 97.6
Q4 111.2 92.1 97.7
2011
Q1 115.5 93.3 95.6
Q2 114.6 100.2 101.0
Q3 119.5 95.0 104.0
Q4 124.0 96.5 104.1
2012
Q1 127.3 98.3 104.5
Q2 133.1 99.1 99.7
Q3 133.7 99.0 100.8
Q4 138.1 99.1 99.9
2013
Q1 141.5 99.7 101.5
Q2 143.7 99.8 99.1
Q3 146.6 97.8 99.7
Q4 147.8 100.4 99.9
2014
Q1 151.5 98.7 101.5
Q2 152.6 100.1 100.0
Q3 154.5 101.9 99.4
Q4 157.3 104.1 102.5
2015
Q1 141.8 98.1 94.3
Q2 135.1 95.1 88.6
Q3 128.9 93.1 86.6
Q4 124.0 92.8 87.6
2016
Q1 118.7 84.4 88.2
Q2 114.1 86.3 88.8
Q3 121.4 80.1 87.2
Q4 113.1 78.8 86.7
2017
Q1 113.0 85.9 92.2
Q2 114.4 87.6 95.5
Q3 116.1 86.6 98.5
Q4 117.9 94.1 95.5
2018
Q1 117.0 94.5 105.8
Q2 117.4 97.9 107.7
Q3 116.7 93.8 106.1
Q4 115.7 94.3 109.6
2019
Q1 119.3 102.8 104.8
Q2 119.9 95.5 104.0
Q3 123.0 94.2 105.4
Q4 124.1 88.1 105.4
2020
Q1 125.3 87.0 106.7
Q2 105.9 67.1 97.2
Q3 104.2 81.5 100.4
Q4 102.0 86.7 101.6
2021
Q1 105.8 81.6 103.1
Q2 108.2 87.2 103.3
Q3 109.2 87.1 101.2
Q4 112.8 87.9 100.6
2022
Q1 116.1 88.7 100.0

What type of investment will spur productivity growth? High-tech services are leading the adoption of digital technologies

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Companies have been changing how information and communications technology (ICT) inputs are being integrated into their production systems. Over the last decade, spending on ICT services as intermediate inputs, possibly linked to cloud computing and other advances in data management, has risen at a faster pace than traditional outlays on ICT capital. 

End of text box
  • In early 2022, about one in five companies reported that they plan to increase spending on new or additional digital technologies in the next 12 months.
  • High-tech service industries are leading the way.
    • Over 40% of businesses in information and cultural industries, along with 38% in professional, scientific and technical services, intend to purchase new or additional digital technologies.
    • About one-quarter of manufacturers intend to do so.

Key questions: How widespread are the employment and income gains associated with advances in digital technology? To what extent will these benefit higher- and lower-skilled workers?

Chart 6

Data table for chart 6 
Percentage of businesses planning to adopt new or additional digital technologies over the next 12 months
Table summary
This table displays the results of Percentage of businesses planning to adopt new or additional digital technologies over the next 12 months . The information is grouped by Industries (appearing as row headers), Rate, calculated using percent units of measure (appearing as column headers).
Industries Rate
percent
Information and cultural industries 42.0
Professional, scientific and technical services 37.4
Finance and insurance 33.7
Wholesale trade 31.6
Manufacturing 27.0
Arts, entertainment and recreation 25.0
Health care and social assistance 22.8
All industries 21.9
Retail trade 20.7
Other services (except public administration) 18.4
Real estate and rental and leasing 18.0
Accommodation and food services 17.0
Transportation and warehousing 16.5
Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting 14.6
Mining, quarrying, and oil and gas extraction 12.7
Administrative and support services 12.7
Construction 11.1

Supply chain disruptions are likely to impact productivity growth in the near term

Logistical challenges continue to mount

  • 4 in 10 businesses anticipate transportation costs to be a barrier in the coming months (second quarter, 2022).
  • Challenges related to supply chains have grown steadily since mid-2021. Over one-quarter of businesses anticipate difficulties in acquiring inputs, products or supplies domestically.
    • Over two-thirds of these businesses expecting supply chain challenges reported that these challenges have worsened in recent months, and more than half expect these disruptions to continue for six months or more.
  • About 1 in 20 businesses expecting supply chain challenges plan to relocate supply chain activities to Canada over the next year, while a similar number plan to relocate activities outside Canada.

Chart 7

Data table for chart 7 
Business plans to adjust supply chains over the next 12 months, second quarter of 2022
Table summary
This table displays the results of Business plans to adjust supply chains over the next 12 months Relocate supply chain activities to Canada and Relocate supply chain activities outside Canada, calculated using percent units of measure (appearing as column headers).
Relocate supply chain activities to Canada Relocate supply chain activities outside Canada
percent
Arts, entertainment and recreation 17.0 3.5
Professional, scientific and technical services 13.3 10.2
Transportation and warehousing 10.2 10.5
Mining, quarrying, and oil and gas extraction 10.1 3.4
Accommodation and food services 9.5 6.3
Manufacturing 8.8 10.6
Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting 6.4 2.3
All industries 5.9 5.4
Retail trade 5.8 8.7
Administrative and support, waste management and remediation services 5.7 2.2
Wholesale trade 4.2 5.5
Real estate and rental and leasing 4.2 2.4
Other services 4.0 2.8
Construction 2.7 1.5
Information and cultural industries 2.6 0.2
Health care and social assistance 0.5 0.2
Finance and insurance 0.0 10.6

Relocation of supply chains may have deeper impacts on productivity in trade-oriented sectors such as manufacturing

Labour productivity in the manufacturing sector was more impacted by pandemic-related disruptions

  • Manufacturing industries with more exposure to foreign supply shocks (whose production depends more on imported intermediate inputs) experienced a larger decline in labour productivity over the course of the pandemic.
  • If productivity growth in manufacturing had maintained its pre-pandemic trend, overall business sector productivity during the first two years of the pandemic would have been about 0.3 percentage points higher.

Given foreign exposure, reshoring supply chains may have direct impacts on productivity

  • Over three-quarters of Canadian manufacturers rely on imported goods or services, 90% of whom use these inputs in the production of other goods and services in Canada. Imports can enhance firm productivity by allowing Canadian firms to access foreign inputs and technologies that are unavailable or more expensive domestically. Reshoring efforts that are intended to shorten supply chains to limit exposure to external shocks may come at a cost to productivity.  

Chart 8

Data table for chart 8 
Change in average annual labour productivity growth from 2010 to 2019 and 2019 to 2021 by exposure to foreign supply shocks, manufacturing sector
Table summary
This table displays the results of Change in average annual labour productivity growth from 2010 to 2019 and 2019 to 2021 by exposure to foreign supply shocks Exposure to foreign supply shocks, calculated using percent units of measure (appearing as column headers).
Exposure to foreign supply shocks
percent
High -4.0
Low -1.0

Cross-border activity facilitates access to innovation and technology that are essential for productivity growth

Exposure to foreign markets and improvements in productivity go hand in hand

  • Industries that are heavily exposed to external supply chain shocks, such as manufacturing and oil and gas extraction, are often those that bring innovative technologies to domestic producers through cross-border trade and foreign direct investment. These cross-border linkages are important sources of productivity growth.
  • Statistics Canada research has shown that exporters are 37% more likely to use foreign technologies than non-exporters. Firms that begin to export are also more likely to begin conducting research and development and to collaborate on research and development with foreign buyers.

Foreign multinationals remain important conduits for innovation and technology transfer

While foreign multinationals account for 15% of Canada’s economic output, they account for almost two-thirds of Canada’s merchandise trade, and over 70% of cross-border trade in technical knowledge and technology-based services. Canada’s trade in commercial services has grown significantly since 2010, pointing to new opportunities.

Chart 9

Data table for chart 9 
Foreign multinationals, share of economic activity, annual average, 2015 to 2019
Table summary
This table displays the results of Foreign multinationals Percent (appearing as column headers).
Percent
Gross domestic product 15
Merchandise exports 61
Commercial service exports 48
Technology exports 71
Merchandise imports 68
Commercial service imports 55
Technology imports 75
Corporate research and development expenditures 40

Takeaways

Raising labour productivity will be increasingly important for improving living standards

  • With one-fifth of working Canadians nearing retirement age in the coming decade, higher productivity will be needed to offset the impact of the aging population on Canada’s workforce. Higher productivity will also be essential for sustaining real wage growth and enhancing the productive capacity of Canadian industry.

As the disruptive impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic fade, sustained productivity gains will need to be led by business investment

  • Non-residential investment has been slow to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic and remains well below peak levels observed in 2014 when large capital outlays in the energy sector fueled productivity growth and income gains. As energy investment decouples from oil prices, other sectors of the economy will need to emerge as key investment drivers.
  • The widespread adoption of digital services, accelerated by the pandemic, may provide an important source of productivity growth akin to the integration of information and communications technology in the 1990s. In early 2022, about one in five businesses was planning to increase spending on this technology over the next year.

Reshoring may come at a cost to productivity, while cross-border linkages that facilitate innovation and technology transfer may be the key to productivity gains over the longer term

  • Persistent logistical challenges and escalating input costs may adversely impact productivity in the near term as companies adjust supply chains; productivity gains over the longer term will depend in part on maintaining access to globally competitive technologies.
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