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Summary of: Social Assistance Use in Canada: National and Provincial Trends in Incidence, Entry and Exit

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I. Introduction

For many Canadian families, Social Assistance (SA) usage reflects near-destitution and an exclusion from the social and economic mainstream. For children, it can represent a critical period of disadvantage with potentially lasting effects. While committed to SA, governments worry about cost. Thus, when SA participation rose during the recession of the early 1990s, virtually all provinces instituted changes to reduce SA dependency. Eligibility rules were made tighter, benefit levels cut, and “snitch” lines introduced. Following these changes, and the economic recovery post-1995, the number of SA-dependent individuals dropped from 3.1 million to under 2 million by 2000, while benefits received fell from \$14.3b in 1994 to \$10.4b in 2001 (current dollars).¹

This paper maps the cycle of SA dependency, focusing on empirical records of SA entry, exit, and annual participation rates, placing these in the economic and policy context of the 1990s. The paper begins with a description of the database used, sample selection and editing procedures, the unit of analysis, a definition of SA participation, and the measure of entry and exit from SA. It then turns to the economic and policy backdrop of the 1990s, before showing results at the national and provincial levels. We conclude with a summary of main findings.

II. The data and definition of terms

II.1 *The LAD database*

We use the tax-based Longitudinal Administrative Database (LAD) to map SA dependency. The LAD is a 20% representative sample of Canadian tax filers, constructed from Canada Customs and Revenue Agency records. The LAD follows individuals over time, matching them into family units on an annual basis, providing individual- and family-level information on incomes, taxes, and basic demographic characteristics. The first year of data is 1982, but only the 1992–2000 period is employed here, as SA is not well captured in earlier years. The LAD’s coverage is broad (95–97% of the adult population), and since 1992, individuals have reported SA income on tax forms, resulting in an 80–90% capture rate of social assistance payments. The LAD data define individuals before and after participation in SA, and over the course of SA spells, allowing us to track participation rates in any given year, as well as entry and exit patterns.² Policy developments vary by province and family type, and with the LAD’s large sample sizes, we can illuminate different experiences of SA and suggest future policy directions.

II.2 *Sample selection*

Our working samples include individuals who filed tax forms in any consecutive five-year period (1992–1996, 1993–1997, 1994–1998, 1995–1999, 1996–2000), allowing us to estimate entry and exit rates. We use only individuals aged 18 to 64. The lower cut-off eliminates students and others in the early stages of the transition to economic independence who are often not even eligible for SA (rules vary by province). Older individuals are not generally eligible for SA (they qualify for Old Age Security, Canada/Quebec Pension Plan, etc.), and are therefore not included. Post-secondary students are deleted for reasons mentioned above and, finally, individuals

1. <http://www.hrdc-drhc.gc.ca/sp-ps/socialp-psociale/statistics/75-76/tabfig/tab438e.html>

2. Recent literature has stressed mapping flows into and out of dependence, as opposed to modeling simply the behaviour of dependents (Klerman and Haider (2001); Mueser, Hotchkiss, King, Rokicki and Stevens (2000)).

showing evidence of a disability over the five-year period are deleted, and left for a separate study.

II.3 The unit of analysis and definitional issues

For this study, individuals were classified as part of one of four family types: single (no spouse, no children), married (or common-law) with no children, married (or common-law) with children, or lone parent.³ An individual is defined as receiving SA in any particular year if he/she reports SA income of at least \$101 at the family level (for example, the respondent and/or his or her spouse declare SA income in this amount). The \$101 cut-off minimizes the effects of reporting and coding errors, and otherwise counts very small amounts as (effectively) zero.⁴

For any two consecutive years, entry into SA is deemed to have occurred in the second year if the individual is not on SA (as defined above) in the first year, but is on SA in the second. In any two consecutive years, an exit is defined to have occurred in the first if the person was on SA then, but not the next. The data imply that at some point in the first year the person went off SA: they report SA income for the first year, but the absence of *any* SA income in the second year indicates they were no longer on SA at the end of the first year, leading into the second. In addition, we need to observe the individual in the year before any pair of years that define whether or not an exit has occurred, in order to determine province and family status at the beginning of the interval. The analysis of exits thus requires three-year sequences of data.

III. The economic and policy environment

Although there has been concern that persons receiving SA can become dependent on the program some substantial reverses occurred during the 1990s. What was the economic and policy context of these dramatic reversals? First, after a deep recession, the economy recovered, with the unemployment rate dropping 5% from its peak rate, through the year 2000, providing an opportunity to escape from, or avoid, welfare dependency. Second, for the majority of family types in most provinces, the real value of SA benefits fell. Although trends varied by province and family type, some declines were precipitous, providing strong incentives for individuals to seek alternatives to SA. Third, provincial governments changed the rules governing the receipt of SA and related administrative procedures, some adopting more aggressive reforms than others.

At the broader political level, there was a transformation in federal-provincial funding of SA. In its 1995 budget, the federal government cut transfers to the provinces, and introduced a lump-sum transfer to cover SA, health, and post-secondary education. From being a shared-cost program, SA expenditures became the responsibility of provincial governments, changing the financial incentives of provinces with respect to spending.

Two other important federal programs were introduced in the 1990s. First, the Canada Child Tax Benefit (CCTB) was introduced in 1992, and a supplement, put into place in 1998, was directed

3. We do not include “filing children” (unattached individuals over the age of 20, living with their parents) as their eligibility for SA varies provincially; it is not clear how to measure their SA participation; policy implications are less clear; and their numbers are relatively small.

4. A large number of individuals tend to be grouped at values such as \$1 and \$100, but few between these and more substantial amounts, suggesting the possibility that these are errors. In any event, the amount of SA income is negligible, prompting us to call these individuals non-recipients.

specifically to low-income families with children. Most provinces reduced SA payments to households with children by an amount equal to the supplement. However, the CCTB and its supplement may have induced a jump from no-work to work, and therefore possibly an exit from (or a deterred entry onto) SA participation, because of the resulting decrease in the claw-back of total benefits as individuals enter the labour market. Second, Employment Insurance (EI) rules were tightened in 1990, 1994, and 1996, increasing barriers to EI and reducing benefits. Arguably, individuals may substitute SA for EI as the latter becomes less available.

IV. Findings at the national level

IV.1 Incidence: Annual participation rates

At the national level, singles and couples without children experienced peaks in SA use in 1993, as did couples with children in 1994, and lone mothers in 1995 (Table A3). Thereafter, all groups experienced significant and steady declines. All had lower dependency rates at the end of the period than at the beginning, except for single individuals, whose rates remained about the same.⁵ Single mothers showed the most dramatic change: by 2000, their rate of SA use was 33.6%, compared to a peak of 50.1%, a relative decline of 33%. Couples without children generally had the lowest rates, ranging from 4% to 6%; couples with children had moderately higher rates, from 6% to 9%; unattached individuals were between the others, varying from 15% to 20% over time.

IV.2 Entry

There is a strong decline in entry rates among all family types over time (Table A4). Lone mothers are again notable, with the highest entry rate in every year, and the largest absolute decline through time. Approximately 13% of all lone mothers not on SA in 1992 became dependent on SA in 1993, whereas the entry rate decreased to 4.8% by 2000 — a relative decline of 64%. Couples had lower entry rates in every year than lone mothers and singles, and more moderate (albeit still very large in relative terms) declines over time. Couples with children experienced a decline in entry rates from 1.79% in 1992 to 0.55% in 2000 (a reduction of 67%), while couples without children showed similar levels and trends. Singles again lie between the other groups, their entry rates declining from under 6% to just below 2%.

IV.3 Exits

Exit rates are less uniform (Table A5). For lone mothers, there was a sizeable increase in exit rates. In 1992, they were at the bottom, with the probability of exiting SA at 12.4%; by 2000, they were in the middle, with a rate of 21.4%. However, singles had steady decreases in exit rates and had the lowest rates at the end of the period. Couples with children had the highest exit rates in almost all years, and these increased over time. Couples without children began with the highest exit rates, but by 2000 had the same level as lone mothers. In sum, exit rates by family type have considerable variability and different time trends, especially when compared to entry rates.

5. Similar changes have been observed by Statistics Canada (2002).

V. The provincial experience

V.1 *The context*

A province-by-province analysis of SA illuminates the effect of different policy measures on welfare experiences across the economy. For example, did the attempts by Ontario and Alberta to make SA less attractive to potential claimants affect SA dynamics and annual participation rates? In addition, the economic recovery at the end of the 1990s was not uniform across all provinces. Did this affect SA dynamics?

V.2 *Incidence*

Singles: Every province experienced an upward movement in SA rates from 1992 to 1993 and a downward trend beginning a year or two later, with some important differences. Alberta had the lowest rate in most years, falling to 9.2% by 2000, and P.E.I. was second at 12.1%. Quebec and Newfoundland showed an opposing pattern—their rates rose sharply in 1993, and remained high through 2000, to finish well above the other provinces at rates of 21.4% and 21.0%, respectively. Ontario, which carries the largest population weight in national-level statistics, went from having one of the highest SA rates in years to one of the lowest. The Prairie and Maritime Provinces were generally close to the mean in both levels and trends, thus characterizing an “average” set of experiences.

Couples with children: The patterns were broadly similar to those for singles. Some provinces, Ontario and Alberta in particular, had greater relative declines than others. Newfoundland was again an exception, while Quebec was more like the other provinces for this family type.

Couples without children: Alberta no longer had a uniquely lower rate; its rates were similar to Saskatchewan, P.E.I., and Manitoba. Newfoundland and Quebec maintained the higher rates that emerged in 1993, and Ontario had the largest decreases.

Lone mothers: Both the initial peaks and subsequent declines were more dispersed. Alberta and Ontario experienced steep declines, though from different peaks. Newfoundland maintained the highest rates over time, while Quebec attained one of the lowest rates by the end of the decade. The remaining provinces have an inverted U-shaped dependency rate to varying degrees.

V.3 *Entry*

Singles: All provinces experienced substantial decreases in entry for singles. Newfoundland had the highest rates, albeit with declines over time. Alberta had the lowest in most years, although not uniquely so. Ontario again showed the greatest decline: from 6.2% in 1992 to 1.4% in 2000, the latter being approximately the same rate as B.C., Alberta, and Manitoba.

Couples with children: Newfoundland again had the highest rates, but this time also showed the largest decline over time: 61% between 1992 and 2000. Other provinces showed weaker downward trends, with the exception of Ontario, which, by 2000, had the lowest entry rate of all provinces. Saskatchewan moved from the middle towards higher than average entry rates.

Couples without children: Newfoundland had the highest rates, even as they declined over time. Ontario had the greatest decreases, with Quebec and B.C. also showing significant declines.

Lone mothers: There was a broad, occasionally erratic, pattern of declines. Newfoundland was particularly volatile, but was characterized by generally high rates throughout. Ontario, once again, experienced the greatest declines in entry rates, with Quebec not far behind. Saskatchewan was an outlier showing increases, rather than decreases, to end with the highest entry rates.

V.4 Exits

Singles: Quebec had the lowest exit rates in all years. Putting these together with the province's relatively high entry rates yields the highest annual incidences (driven by both entry and exit-side dynamics) of SA participation of all provinces, with relatively little fall-off during the 1990s growth years. Newfoundland had a similar pattern: consistently low exit rates and high, though declining, entry rates, giving high annual incidences with only a small decline near the end of the 1990s. Ontario, in contrast, experienced middle-rank exit rates, with moderate declines over time; yet when combined with strong reductions in entry rates, the result was a vigorous reduction in incidence. Several other provinces were similar, although the changes were less dramatic. Alberta had an unusually large decline in exits, from 34.8% in 1992 to 15% in 2000, consistent with the interpretation of the Alberta welfare reforms of 1993/94 as described by Boessenkool (1997). Alberta reduced entrants by making it difficult for those of school-leaving age to gain access to welfare (many were, instead, rerouted back to school). Thus, after the 1993 changes, the pool of SA participants had a lower overall level of human capital, and it is not surprising that exit rates fell. Nonetheless, Alberta had the lowest SA participation rates among singles by the end of the decade.

Couples with children: These showed broadly upward-trending exit rates, with significant provincial differences. Quebec and Newfoundland have the lowest exit rates, Alberta had the highest (although with no additional increase over time), while the other provinces had a fairly uniform pattern of moderately rising rates over time. The differences in exit rates between provinces were large, of the order of two-to-one. The change in incidence for couples with children in Newfoundland (well above other provinces by the end of the period) was driven by both entry and exit dynamics. Conversely, Alberta's large decline in entry rates, from 1.1% in 1992 to 0.5% in 2000, drove its decline in incidence to uniquely low levels by 2000. Ontario's significant decline from relatively high to relatively low levels was driven by a moderate rise in exit rates and dramatic decreases in entry. Quebec's low exit rates were the main contributor to its relatively high incidences in the later years. More or less average levels and trends in entry and exit dynamics drove the other provinces' records.

Couples without children: Most provinces had a modest decline in exit rates. This group thus appears more akin to singles than couples with children: the general trend was downward, though not strongly so. Newfoundland's high annual participation rates, especially in later years, were driven by both its very high entry and its relatively low exit rates. Quebec was similar, but its particularly low exit rates played a more significant role. Ontario's movement from relatively high to relatively average participation rates was, in contrast, driven by its declines in entry rates. Its exit rates remained in the middle rank, declining moderately over time. Alberta had the highest exit rates in the early years, but the greatest declines over time, its low incidence resulting from a combination of generally low entry rates and high, albeit declining, exit rates.

Lone mothers: Exit rates increased in all provinces from 1993 on, making lone mothers resemble couples with children, rather than singles or couples without children, Alberta's rates were again

the highest, Newfoundland's and Quebec's among the lowest. Ontario showed the greatest increase over time. Ontario's significant decreases in incidence over time were a combination of both higher exit and lower entry side factors, while Newfoundland's increases in incidence were similarly driven from both sides. Alberta's dramatic declines in incidence were driven mostly by the exit side, in contrast to Ontario and the other family types.

VI. Conclusion

The major findings are the following. First, incidence, exit and entry broadly follow the economic cycle at the national level. Second, for entry and incidence, rates peak between 1993 and 1995, then decline over the rest of the decade; the precise pattern and ultimate level of decline varies considerably by family type. Third, exit patterns, in contrast, are more variable, and exhibit pronounced differences across family types, with the presence of children playing a decisive role: couples with children and lone mothers have experienced an increase in their exit rates; unattached individuals and couples without children have experienced the opposite. Finally, at the provincial level, there are important differences in trends and patterns, in terms of magnitude, timing, and even the direction of changes.

The results provide a context for discussions of recent policy initiatives aimed at reducing welfare dependency, for example, the National Child Tax Benefit and the Self Sufficiency Experiment, both of which are aimed at families with children—the family types which experienced the most significant decreases in welfare participation rates through the 1990s.

Table A3: Social Assistance Rates

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Singles									
Canada	15,03	20,47	20,26	20,09	19,25	18,69	17,84	16,88	15,92
NFLD.	11,50	18,47	19,53	22,34	21,90	22,67	22,20	21,61	21,04
P.E.I.	11,54	15,91	15,71	13,77	13,54	14,02	14,37	12,71	12,01
N.S.	10,52	16,10	16,24	16,93	16,48	16,68	14,64	15,83	12,67
N.B.	15,08	21,35	19,46	20,11	19,14	19,28	18,83	18,25	17,49
QUE.	16,76	23,42	23,85	24,22	24,34	24,23	23,55	22,32	21,38
ONT.	16,44	21,09	20,89	20,06	18,85	18,03	16,82	15,50	14,11
MAN.	14,26	17,33	16,00	17,17	14,84	14,62	13,83	12,61	12,17
SASK.	9,93	16,16	17,38	16,53	16,16	14,92	15,08	14,35	15,35
ALTA.	10,43	12,62	10,42	10,78	10,64	9,48	9,55	9,43	9,23
B.C.	13,28	20,61	20,76	19,25	17,43	16,75	15,81	15,49	15,44
Attached with Children									
Canada	7,76	9,22	9,35	8,91	8,39	7,78	7,04	6,29	5,92
NFLD.	8,31	11,21	11,33	13,21	13,29	12,88	12,42	11,35	10,75
P.E.I.	7,02	7,99	7,48	7,66	6,61	7,06	6,04	5,37	4,62
N.S.	6,15	8,17	7,97	7,96	7,88	7,50	6,34	7,13	5,80
N.B.	7,74	8,86	8,10	7,80	8,51	8,44	7,88	7,21	7,08
QUE.	6,88	8,56	9,08	8,82	9,16	9,03	8,01	7,33	7,06
ONT.	9,05	10,57	11,13	10,33	9,10	8,31	7,45	6,30	5,63
MAN.	6,12	7,27	6,93	6,95	6,47	6,00	5,48	5,20	5,07
SASK.	6,35	7,91	8,41	7,44	7,35	6,98	7,43	7,21	7,75
ALTA.	7,61	7,59	5,31	5,21	4,82	3,66	3,86	3,70	3,59
B.C.	7,10	8,95	9,25	8,71	7,88	6,96	5,89	5,48	5,53
Attached without Children									
Canada	4,64	6,14	6,00	5,47	5,05	4,76	4,33	3,98	3,99
NFLD.	4,41	6,07	5,98	6,61	6,80	6,99	6,69	6,58	6,18
P.E.I.	3,05	4,20	3,85	2,44	2,89	2,94	2,61	2,51	2,02
N.S.	3,34	4,98	4,63	4,46	4,48	4,02	3,28	3,72	3,38
N.B.	4,50	6,10	5,76	5,43	5,21	5,20	5,15	4,54	4,62
QUE.	5,27	7,03	7,26	6,92	6,93	6,73	6,16	5,62	5,65
ONT.	5,16	6,79	6,65	5,84	4,99	4,65	4,16	3,72	3,67
MAN.	2,98	3,65	3,30	3,27	2,77	2,49	2,03	2,20	2,05
SASK.	2,43	3,55	3,45	3,17	2,83	2,66	2,51	2,51	2,64
ALTA.	3,67	4,01	2,92	2,96	2,77	2,34	2,42	2,43	2,60
B.C.	3,95	5,65	5,62	4,85	4,37	3,99	3,30	3,15	3,20
Lone Mothers									
Canada	46,92	47,96	48,63	50,11	47,55	45,41	41,61	36,32	33,58
NFLD.	46,37	50,91	51,35	55,68	53,55	55,25	53,74	49,20	49,71
P.E.I.	50,00	53,79	50,98	45,52	46,21	44,22	43,75	36,55	36,00
N.S.	52,52	56,09	56,27	56,38	53,56	53,12	44,99	50,05	41,46
N.B.	52,88	51,74	46,82	47,61	47,60	48,31	45,06	40,67	38,84
QUE.	37,66	41,92	43,87	45,70	44,77	43,93	39,65	35,19	31,97
ONT.	53,42	52,91	54,91	56,08	52,27	49,66	45,18	37,49	33,18
MAN.	42,71	42,39	42,22	43,49	41,36	39,01	37,65	34,09	33,66
SASK.	45,69	47,68	47,73	48,43	46,67	45,43	44,58	45,71	44,44
ALTA.	45,47	40,17	34,68	34,10	31,93	26,98	25,26	22,61	22,20
B.C.	46,90	48,53	49,31	52,73	49,22	46,16	41,32	37,83	37,06

Table A4: Entry Rates

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Singles								
Canada	5,79	3,76	3,61	2,86	3,12	2,46	2,23	1,79
NFLD.	8,04	5,44	6,08	3,84	4,70	3,55	3,54	3,93
P.E.I.	5,14	3,64	2,60	2,71	3,71	2,29	2,10	1,29
N.S.	4,51	3,68	3,59	2,99	3,38	2,66	2,02	2,01
N.B.	6,11	3,77	4,75	3,20	3,87	3,06	3,07	2,69
QUE.	6,19	3,90	3,83	3,52	3,98	3,06	2,77	2,35
ONT.	6,24	4,06	3,60	2,68	2,91	2,18	1,92	1,42
MAN.	4,70	2,71	3,19	2,14	2,64	1,91	1,69	1,45
SASK.	4,38	3,40	2,84	2,24	2,72	2,53	2,29	1,87
ALTA.	3,56	2,17	2,93	1,93	1,56	1,88	1,73	1,37
B.C.	5,88	3,98	3,53	2,88	2,97	2,36	2,27	1,65
Attached with Children								
Canada	1,79	1,23	1,13	0,94	0,85	0,76	0,67	0,55
NFLD.	4,14	2,25	3,28	2,31	1,98	2,12	1,77	1,62
P.E.I.	1,42	1,67	0,97	1,45	1,49	0,74	0,73	0,74
N.S.	2,02	1,42	1,53	1,31	1,05	0,96	0,64	0,68
N.B.	2,00	0,98	1,29	1,61	1,55	1,18	0,84	1,02
QUE.	1,69	1,23	1,16	1,04	0,95	0,71	0,66	0,59
ONT.	1,98	1,36	1,00	0,76	0,74	0,60	0,49	0,38
MAN.	1,38	0,68	0,84	0,72	0,73	0,57	0,69	0,68
SASK.	1,45	1,09	0,85	1,12	0,97	1,40	1,25	1,21
ALTA.	1,14	0,71	1,00	0,81	0,46	0,88	0,69	0,45
B.C.	1,69	1,33	1,23	0,96	0,97	0,76	0,88	0,62
Attached without Children								
Canada	1,34	0,99	0,90	0,71	0,70	0,55	0,45	0,34
NFLD.	1,82	1,45	2,05	1,36	1,48	1,33	1,21	0,92
P.E.I.	1,36	0,43	0,83	0,00	0,73	0,72	0,69	0,33
N.S.	1,30	0,85	0,76	0,82	0,67	0,51	0,45	0,44
N.B.	1,29	1,01	1,08	0,99	0,97	0,92	0,59	0,68
QUE.	1,54	1,19	1,11	0,95	0,92	0,68	0,59	0,40
ONT.	1,45	1,11	0,89	0,68	0,67	0,46	0,34	0,27
MAN.	0,85	0,36	0,60	0,25	0,33	0,20	0,31	0,20
SASK.	0,84	0,53	0,36	0,29	0,38	0,28	0,31	0,27
ALTA.	0,73	0,51	0,62	0,47	0,37	0,50	0,39	0,32
B.C.	1,30	0,85	0,85	0,65	0,69	0,54	0,46	0,32
Lone Mothers								
Canada	13,25	8,45	8,39	6,26	6,66	5,80	5,40	4,83
NFLD.	18,81	10,82	14,05	7,02	10,38	9,44	4,74	7,96
P.E.I.	19,23	10,87	9,62	10,00	6,78	9,52	7,69	6,85
N.S.	13,74	8,88	7,19	7,00	7,94	6,28	5,31	5,50
N.B.	13,44	8,31	11,40	8,58	9,41	6,92	5,57	5,36
QUE.	13,00	7,14	6,59	5,81	6,82	4,69	4,27	3,90
ONT.	14,18	9,08	7,82	5,47	5,89	4,74	4,75	3,88
MAN.	10,32	7,48	7,39	5,23	5,21	5,56	5,47	5,60
SASK.	13,85	10,41	11,11	8,17	9,17	12,74	11,32	11,02
ALTA.	9,72	7,31	8,94	7,16	5,71	7,11	6,12	5,27
B.C.	13,74	9,84	11,29	7,05	7,68	6,66	7,04	6,32

Table A5: Exit Rates

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Singles							
Canada	17.93	15.80	18.04	15.75	16.24	14.52	12.41
NFLD.	22.49	12.33	17.58	14.56	15.58	15.14	11.76
P.E.I.	25.00	25.64	21.95	15.00	22.45	14.00	15.91
N.S.	17.29	16.06	18.06	17.98	17.57	16.02	21.45
N.B.	21.94	17.86	18.73	15.60	16.98	14.00	13.01
QUE.	11.75	10.99	14.64	12.47	13.10	11.83	9.91
ONT.	19.44	18.14	19.38	16.50	18.00	16.57	13.78
MAN.	19.11	13.28	19.51	16.99	20.60	19.94	15.29
SASK.	20.72	20.39	19.06	19.86	17.35	13.02	12.22
ALTA.	34.81	20.66	21.67	23.67	16.95	16.67	15.04
B.C.	22.98	21.37	22.58	20.17	19.71	16.23	13.71
Attached with Children							
Canada	26.48	26.60	27.51	27.32	28.55	30.49	29.81
NFLD.	25.77	16.93	20.36	21.27	24.64	24.49	24.14
P.E.I.	36.36	31.82	40.00	28.57	33.33	42.11	46.15
N.S.	32.52	32.03	27.07	30.60	28.57	33.06	29.79
N.B.	35.76	23.26	26.09	28.17	29.66	30.50	28.81
QUE.	17.73	20.00	20.35	19.97	23.97	26.52	23.03
ONT.	25.32	28.14	30.02	27.21	28.56	31.50	32.77
MAN.	27.74	25.52	28.86	28.06	33.09	30.00	29.90
SASK.	26.24	32.24	30.61	32.43	29.20	29.73	31.85
ALTA.	47.94	40.48	39.04	48.10	39.56	39.90	43.02
B.C.	35.34	33.72	33.05	38.96	38.63	36.59	34.58
Attached without Children							
Canada	26.54	27.21	27.18	25.20	24.86	23.54	21.06
NFLD.	23.81	23.08	25.00	23.19	21.33	23.26	17.72
P.E.I.	33.33	20.00	50.00	33.33	25.00	50.00	33.33
N.S.	37.21	38.64	26.67	34.00	32.61	28.26	25.58
N.B.	32.69	33.33	26.67	25.00	22.39	26.32	18.46
QUE.	18.11	22.41	22.21	19.45	20.68	19.68	17.30
ONT.	27.44	28.11	28.48	26.04	26.19	25.27	23.18
MAN.	31.91	23.08	25.00	23.08	32.43	18.52	32.00
SASK.	28.13	27.27	30.00	27.59	26.67	27.27	28.57
ALTA.	47.83	37.97	36.56	40.23	26.92	24.42	27.16
B.C.	35.09	33.51	34.84	34.60	32.69	29.17	24.83
Lone Mothers							
Canada	12.41	12.17	15.16	16.08	17.40	20.26	21.37
NFLD.	15.71	8.87	11.89	11.31	13.00	16.22	12.38
P.E.I.	18.52	16.00	21.57	19.15	19.57	27.08	28.95
N.S.	9.56	9.17	11.40	10.70	11.38	16.30	16.43
N.B.	21.38	16.78	15.41	13.54	16.72	20.13	16.92
QUE.	9.15	9.98	12.59	12.41	16.80	17.95	18.07
ONT.	9.39	10.59	14.64	15.47	16.07	20.82	24.29
MAN.	15.26	15.72	15.90	18.10	17.50	23.15	21.22
SASK.	17.22	17.31	19.57	18.67	20.48	18.94	18.90
ALTA.	28.80	23.84	26.24	32.82	28.63	31.20	31.52
B.C.	14.62	14.03	16.60	19.41	21.10	19.93	19.22

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